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The Philosophical Review, Vol. C, No. 1 (January 1991) 
Physicalist Theories of Color' 
Paul A. Boghossian 
J. David Velleman 
THE PROBLEM OF COLOR REALISM 
The dispute between realists about color and anti-realists is ac- 
tually a dispute about the nature of color properties. The 
disputants do not disagree over what material objects are like. 
Rather, they disagree over whether any of the uncontroversial 
facts about material objects-their powers to cause visual experi- 
ences, their dispositions to reflect incident light, their atomic 
makeup, and so on-amount to their having colors. The disagree- 
ment is thus about which properties colors are and, in particular, 
whether colors are any of the properties in a particular set that is 
acknowledged on both sides to exhaust the properties of material 
objects. 
In a previous paper we discussed at length one attempt to iden- 
tify colors with particular properties of material objects-namely, 
with their dispositions to cause visual experiences.2 Here we shall 
discuss a different and perhaps more influential version of real- 
ism, which says that the colors of material objects are micro- 
physical properties of their surfaces.3 We shall call this theory 
physicalism about color (physicalism, for short). In order to eval- 
uate this theory, however, we shall first have to clarify some meth- 
odological issues. Our hope is that we can bring some further 
clarity to the question of color realism, whether or not we succeed 
in our critique of the physicalists' answer. 
'For comments on earlier drafts of this paper, we are grateful to David 
Armstrong, C. L. Hardin, David Hills, Sydney Shoemaker, and Steve 
Yablo. 
2"Colour as a Secondary Quality," Mind 98 (1989), pp. 81-103. 
30ur earlier paper contained a brief discussion of this theory, pp. 
82-83. The present paper can be regarded as expanding on that passage. 
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Metaphysics and Semantics 
To say that the question of color realism is really about the na- 
ture of color properties is not yet to define the question suffi- 
ciently. One is tempted to ask, Which are the properties whose 
nature is at issue? 
Of course, the latter question may seem like an invitation to beg 
the former. For in order to say which properties are at issue in the 
debate about the nature of colors, one would have to say which 
properties colors are-which would seem to require settling the 
debate before defining it. How, indeed, can one ever debate the 
nature of a property? Until one knows which property is at issue, 
the debate cannot get started; but as soon as one knows which 
property is at issue, it would seem, the debate is over. 
Well, not quite. One can pick out a property by means of a con- 
tingent fact about it. And one can thereby specify the property 
whose nature is to be debated without preempting the debate. 
Such indirect specifications are what motivate questions about the 
nature of properties. One knows or suspects that there is a prop- 
erty playing a particular role, say, or occupying a particular rela- 
tion, and one wants to know which property it is, given that 
playing the role or occupying the relation isn't the property in 
question. 
The role in which colors command attention, of course, is their 
role as the properties attributed to objects by a particular aspect of 
visual experience. They are the properties that objects appear to 
have when they look colored. What philosophers want to know is 
whether the properties that objects thus appear to have are among 
the ones that they are generally agreed to have in reality. 
Yet if the question is whether some agreed-upon set of proper- 
ties includes the ones that objects appear to have in looking col- 
ored, then it is partly a question about the content of visual ap- 
pearances. When philosophers ask whether colors are real, they 
are asking whether any of the properties acknowledged to be real 
are the ones attributed to an object by the experience of its looking 
colored; and so they are asking, in part, which properties are rep- 
resented in that experience-which is a question of its content. 
What is Looking Colored? 
The foregoing attempt to define which properties are at issue in 
the question of color realism may seem viciously circular. For we 
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identified colors as the properties that things appear to have when 
they look colored; and how can this description help to pick out 
the relevant properties? It specifies the properties in terms of their 
being represented in a particular kind of experience, but then it 
seems to specify the relevant kind of experience in terms of its 
representing those properties. Which properties objects appear to 
have in looking colored depends on what counts as looking col- 
ored, which would seem to depend, in turn, on which properties 
colors are-which is precisely what was to be defined. 
This problem is not insuperable, however. The phrase "looks 
colored" and its determinate cousins-"looks red," "looks blue," 
and so forth-have a referential as well as an attributive use. That 
is, one learns to associate these phrases directly with visual experi- 
ences that are introspectively recognizable as similar in kind to 
paradigm instances. Paradigm cases of looking red fix a reference 
for the phrase "looks red," which then refers to all introspectively 
similar experiences. We can therefore speak of something's 
looking red and rely on the reader to know which kind of visual 
experience we mean, without our having to specify which property 
red iS.4 There is no circularity, then, in identifying red as the prop- 
erty attributed to objects by their looking red and, more generally, 
in identifying colors as the properties attributed to objects by their 
looking colored.5 
4These remarks are intended to apply exclusively to expressions of the 
form "looks colored." Expressions of the form "seeing something as col- 
ored," "appearing to be colored," and so forth, will be interpreted compo- 
sitionally. 
Note that the problem discussed in this passage doesn't preclude "looks 
red" from meaning "visually appears to be red," in the sense of con- 
tributing that content to the statements in which it is used. If the kind of 
experience denoted by "looks red" is the kind that represents its object as 
red, then the phrase may indeed be used to introduce the content "visually 
appears to be red." The problem discussed here merely restricts the way 
in which the phrase may acquire its reference to that kind of experience. 
(See note 18, below.) 
5Here a further complication arises. We assume in the text that there is 
a single property represented by all or most instances of looking red. 
There will certainly be such a property if the way in which experiences 
qualify as instances of something's looking red is by representing the same 
property as the paradigm instance. In that case, the paradigm of some- 
thing's looking red will define a kind of experience whose instances at- 
tribute the same property to their objects, and so all instances of looking 
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Color Experience vs. Color Discourse 
One might think that the references we have stipulated here are 
simply the references that color terms have anyway, in ordinary 
discourse. Surely, words like "red" and "blue" are sensory terms, 
designed to report what is seen. One may therefore feel entitled to 
presuppose that the term "red," as used in ordinary discourse, al- 
ready denotes the property that things appear to have when they 
look red. 
Yet the validity of this presupposition may depend on the an- 
swer to the question of color realism. For whether the ordinary 
term "red" always expresses the property that things appear to 
have in looking red may depend on whether that appearance is 
veridical or illusory. Suppose that an error theory of color experi- 
ence is correct, in that the property that things appear to have 
when they look red is a property that they do not (and perhaps 
could not) have. In that case, the meaning of "red" in ordinary 
discourse will be subject to conflicting pressures. The term may 
red will represent the same property. The name "red" can then be fixed 
by the phrase "the property attributed to an object by its looking red." 
But what if kinds of visual appearance are individuated differently? In 
that case, the kind of appearance defined by a paradigm case of some- 
thing's looking red may include appearances representing different prop- 
erties; and so there may be no property represented in most instances of 
looking red. Our attempt to attach the name "red" to the property at- 
tributed to an object by its looking red will consequently fail, since there 
will be no single property predominantly satisfying that description. 
Physicalists who regard this outcome as a live possibility sometimes think 
that the reference of "red" cannot be fixed to a single property; and so 
they make a definition out of the description that we have treated as a 
reference-fixer. That is, they treat "red" as synonymous with the phrase 
"the property attributed to an object by its looking red," and they expect 
the term, so defined, to denote different properties in different circum- 
stances. (See Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, "An Objectivist's Guide 
to Subjectivism About Colour," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 160 
(1987), pp. 127-141.) 
These philosophers may find our usage strange, as we do theirs. But 
our linguistic differences with them will not prevent us from engaging 
them in argument. For they believe that red is a microphysical property in 
some circumstances, in the sense that a microphysical property is the one 
attributed to an object, in those circumstances, by its looking red. And we 
shall argue that an object's looking red never represents it as having a 
microphysical property, under any circumstances at all. Our arguments 
will therefore address their view, though not necessarily in their terms. 
For a related problem, see the following note. 
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still be used to express the property that objects are seen as having 
when they look red. Yet statements calling objects red in that sense 
will be systematically false, even if such statements tend to be 
made, and to garner assent, in reference to objects that have some 
physical property in common. In the interest of saying what's true, 
rather than what merely appears true, speakers may then be in- 
clined to shade the meaning of "red" toward denoting whatever 
property is distinctive of red-looking objects.6 The pressure to- 
wards speaking the truth will thus conflict with the pressure to- 
wards reporting the testimony of vision. How the meaning of 
"red" will fare under these conflicting pressures is hard to predict; 
it may even break apart, yielding two senses of the term, one to 
express the content of color experience and another to denote the 
property tracked by color attributions. 
We are not here proposing or defending such an account of 
6Some may contend that if there is a physical property that's distinctive 
of red-looking objects, then it will inevitably be the property that's at- 
tributed to objects by their looking red. But this contention simply as- 
sumes that the content of color experience is determined in a way that's 
conducive to the truth of physicalism about color-which should not be 
assumed from the outset. We shall consider at length whether the content 
of color experience is determined in this way. At the moment we are 
merely pointing out that until one has ascertained how colors are visually 
represented, one must allow for the possibility that their visual representa- 
tion may have a content that is less useful for people to put into words 
than other facts correlated with color perception. One must therefore 
allow for the possibility that the content of color talk may diverge from 
that of color experience. 
Some may argue that even if color experiences somehow represented 
properties other than external properties correlated with them, they 
would also represent those external properties, by virtue of the correla- 
tion. In that case, color experiences would attribute two different proper- 
ties to their objects, and our identification of colors as the properties at- 
tributed to objects by color experiences would be ambiguous. (We owe this 
suggestion to Sydney Shoemaker.) 
What is being imagined here-if it is indeed imaginable-is that visual 
experiences representing one property would be correlated with another 
property and would thereby come to indicate it, much as a Cretan's saying 
"It's raining" may come to indicate sunshine. If visual experiences repre- 
senting one property could thus come to indicate another, the former 
property would still be identifiable as the one that they represented in the 
first instance (just as rain would be identifiable as what the Cretan was 
reporting in the first instance). Our identification of colors as the proper- 
ties attributed to objects by their looking colored could therefore be easily 
disambiguated. 
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color language. We are merely pointing it out as a possibility and 
suggesting that this possibility shouldn't be excluded at the outset 
of inquiry about color. To assume that color terms denote the 
properties represented in color experience is to assume that terms 
used to attribute those properties to objects wouldn't come under 
pressure from the systematic falsity of such attributions-some- 
thing that may or may not turn out to be the case but shouldn't be 
assumed at the outset. One should begin as an agnostic about 
whether color terms ordinarily denote the properties that are rep- 
resented in color experience. If they are to be used in a debate 
about those properties, their reference to them must be explicitly 
stipulated. 
VERSIONS OF PHYSICALISM 
If physicalism is to settle the debate over color realism, it must be 
formulated as a thesis about the properties at issue in that debate. 
When the physicalist says that colors are microphysical properties, 
he must mean that microphysical properties are the ones attribu- 
ted to objects by their looking colored. Otherwise, his claim will 
not succeed in attaching the uncontroversial reality of micro- 
physical properties to the properties whose reality is in question- 
that is, the properties represented in color experience. Physicalism 
must therefore be, in part, a thesis about which properties color 
experience represents. 
The Naive Objection 
When the physicalist thesis is so interpreted, however, it tends to 
elicit the following, naive objection. The microphysical properties 
of an object are invisible and hence cannot be what is represented 
when the object looks colored. One can tell an object's color just by 
looking at it, but one cannot tell anything about its molecular 
structure-nor, indeed, that it has such a structure-without the 
aid of instruments or experimentation. How can colors, which are 
visible, be microphysical properties, which are not? 
Physicalists regard this objection as obviously mistaken, although 
different physicalists regard it as committing different mistakes. A 
particular physicalist's response to the objection will be condi- 
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tioned by his brand of physicalism, on the one hand, and his con- 
ception of visual representation, on the other. We therefore turn 
our attention, in the next two sections, to these potential differ- 
ences among proponents of physicalism. 
Colors vs. Ways of Being Colored 
The claim that red is a microphysical property can express ei- 
ther of two very different theses. On the one hand, the claim may 
state a strict identity between properties. In that case, it means that 
having a particular microphysical configuration is one and the 
same property as being red. On the other hand, the claim may 
mean that having this microphysical configuration is a way of 
being red and, in particular, the way in which things are red in 
actuality. In that case, the relation drawn between these properties 
is not identity. Rather, red is envisioned as a higher-order prop- 
erty-the property of having some (lower-order) property satis- 
fying particular conditions-and the microphysical configuration 
is envisioned as a lower-order property satisfying those conditions, 
and hence as a realization or embodiment of red. 
The difference between these two views is analogous to that be- 
tween type-physicalism and functionalist materialism in the philo- 
sophy of mind. Physicalism says that pain is one and the same state 
as a configuration of excited neurons. Functionalist materialism 
says that pain is the higher-order state of occupying some state 
that plays a particular role, that this role is played in humans by a 
configuration of excited neurons, and hence that having excited 
neurons is the way in which humans have pain. Both views can be 
expressed by the claim that pain is a neural state, but this claim 
asserts a strict identity only when expressing the former view. 
We shall distinguish between the corresponding views of color 
by referring to them as the physical identity view and the physical 
realization view, or identity-physicalism and realization-physicalism.7 To 
7Note that in our terminology, identity-physicalism entails that colors 
have their microphysical natures necessarily. For in our terminology, the 
thesis "red = microphysical property x" is an identity statement whose 
arguments are rigid designators of properties. 
As we explained in note 5, some physicalists treat "red" as synonymous 
with a non-rigid property description. These physicalists can therefore 
treat the thesis "red = microphysical property x" as a contingent truth. 
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repeat, only identity-physicalism says that red is one and the same 
property as a microphysical configuration; realization-physicalism 
says that the microphysical configuration is merely a way of being 
red. 
Adherents of both identity-physicalism and realization- 
physicalism will dismiss the naive objection mooted above, but they 
will dismiss it on different grounds. A realization-physicalist can 
say that the naive objection confuses color properties with the 
properties that embody them. The ability to see which color an 
object instantiates is perfectly compatible, in his view, with an in- 
ability to see the particular way in which it instantiates that color. 
For in his view, seeing that an object is red consists in seeing that it 
has some property satisfying particular conditions; and seeing that 
an object has some such property need not entail seeing which such 
property it has. The invisibility of microphysical properties there- 
fore doesn't preclude them from realizing or embodying colors. 
This refutation of the naive objection is not available to the 
identity-physicalist, of course, since he doesn't draw any distinction 
between colors and their realizations. The identity-physicalist can 
still fend off the objection, however, by claiming that it miscon- 
strues the use to which he puts the phrase "microphysical proper- 
ties." The objection construes this phrase, he says, as articulating a 
mode of presentation under which colors are represented in visual 
experience-as expressing what colors are seen as-whereas the 
phrase is actually intended only to identify the nature of color 
properties. The physicalist points out that although one never sees 
anything as a layer of molecules-never sees anything under the 
characterization "layer of molecules"-one nevertheless sees 
things that are, in fact, layers of molecules, since that's precisely 
what the visible surfaces of objects are. Similarly, the physicalist 
argues, seeing nothing under the mode of presentation "micro- 
physical property" doesn't prevent one from seeing things that are 
microphysical properties. And that colors are such properties is all 
that any physicalist means to say. 
The Propositional Content of Visual Experience 
Thus, the suggestion that physicalism requires colors to be seen 
under microphysical modes of presentation will be rejected by 
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physicalists of all stripes. Some physicalists will go further, how- 
ever, by denying that colors are seen under any modes of presen- 
tation at all. Whether a physicalist makes this further denial de- 
pends on his views about the propositional content of color experi- 
ence. 
On the one hand, a physicalist may take a fregean view of the 
visual representation of color. According to that view, the experi- 
ence of seeing something as red has that content by virtue of the 
subject's relation to a proposition containing a concept, character- 
ization, or (as we have put it) mode of presentation that is uniquely 
satisfied by instances of red. The property itself is not an element 
of the propositional content, as the fregean conceives it; rather, it 
is represented by an element of the content, namely, a character- 
ization. 
On the other hand, a physicalist might take a completely dif- 
ferent view of how color is visually represented, a view that we 
shall call russellian. According to that view, the experience of 
seeing something as red has that content by virtue of the subject's 
relation to a proposition containing the property red-the prop- 
erty itself, not a conception, characterization, or presentation of it. 
A russellian believes that the property is introduced into the con- 
tent of experience by something that directly refers to it. This item 
may be an introspectible, qualitative feature of visual experience, 
for example, or a word of mentalese tokened in some visual- 
experience "box." Whatever it is, it must be capable of referring to 
the property red directly-say, by virtue of a correlation or causal 
relation with it8-rather than by specifying it descriptively, in the 
sense of having a meaning uniquely satisfied by red objects.9 
8For correlational theories of reference, see F. Dretske, Knowledge and 
the Flow of Information (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981); D. 
Stampe, "Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation," Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977). We have reservations of a general nature 
about the prospects for correlational semantics, but we shall suspend these 
reservations for present purposes. 
9For a russellian view of how colors are visually represented, see Arm- 
strong, in D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm, Consciousness and 
Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind (Oxford, England: Basil Black- 
well, 1984), p. 172: "A perception of something green will involve a green- 
sensitive element, that is to say, something which, in a normal environ- 
ment, is characteristically brought into existence by green things, and 
which in turn permits the perceiver, if he should so desire, to discriminate 
by his behaviour the objects from things which are not green." 
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A strict russellian may believe that the mental symbol for red has 
no descriptive meaning at all-just a reference. A more liberal 
russellian may believe that it has a meaning, but that its meaning is 
not sufficient to specify the property red or to determine a com- 
plete proposition about redness, and hence that the content of 
seeing something as red must still be completed by the property 
itself, introduced via direct reference. The difference between 
these two variants of russellianism is analogous to that between two 
variants of the familiar causal theory about natural-kind terms. On 
the one hand, the word "gold" can be viewed as a name that has no 
descriptive meaning over and above its reference to gold (although 
this reference may have been fixed, of course, with the help of a 
description). On the other hand, "gold" can be viewed as having a 
descriptive meaning such as "a kind of matter," which is not suffi- 
cient to specify a particular kind of matter and must therefore be 
supplemented by a causally mediated relation of reference to gold. 
According to the latter view, "gold" and "silver" share the meaning 
"a kind of matter" but refer to different kinds of matter; and their 
contributions to the content of sentences must include not only 
their shared meaning but also their distinct referents. According 
to the corresponding view about the visual representation of color, 
there are mental symbols for red and orange that may contribute a 
shared meaning to the content of visual experiences-say, "a sur- 
face property"-while introducing different properties as their 
referents. 
A proponent of this liberal russellianism will acknowledge that 
visual experience contains some characterization of colors, but his 
stricter colleague will not, since the strict russellian believes that 
See also Jackson and Pargetter, "An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism 
About Colour," pp. 129- 130: 
What is it for an experience to be the presentation of a property? How must 
experience E be related to property P, or an instance of P, for E to be the 
presentation of P, or, equivalently, for E to represent that P? One thing . .. is 
immediately clear. A necessary condition is that there be a causal connection. 
Sensations of heat are the way heat, that is, molecular kinetic energy, presents 
itself to us. And this is, in part, a matter of kinetic energy causing sensations of 
heat. We say 'in part', because, for instance, the causation must be in the 'right 
way'.... For present purposes, however, the causal part of the story is 
enough. We can work with the rough schema: redness is the property of ob- 
jects which causes objects to look red.... 
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red is introduced into visual content by an item possessing no de- 
scriptive meaning at all. The strict russellian will therefore deny 
that colors are seen under any modes of presentation. And he will 
consequently think of the naive objection to physicalism as doubly 
mistaken-not only in suggesting that he uses the phrase "micro- 
physical property" to articulate such modes of presentation but 
also in suggesting that he acknowledges their existence. 
Further Distinctions 
The foregoing responses to the naive objection are cogent, as far 
as they go; but in our opinion, they don't go far enough. The 
physicalists have described a way in which microphysically consti- 
tuted colors aren't represented in visual experience-namely, 
under microphysical characterizations-but they haven't yet told 
us how else such colors are represented. Similarly, the realization- 
physicalist has described what color properties are not-namely, 
microphysical properties-but he hasn't yet told us what colors are 
instead. The realization-physicalist therefore owes us an account 
of the higher-order properties that are identical with colors, in his 
view; and all of the physicalists owe us an account of how the prop- 
erties with which they identify colors can be the ones represented 
in visual experience. 
Once again, different physicalists are likely to respond differ- 
ently. The distinction between fregeanism and russellianism and 
the distinction between the physical identity view and the physical 
realization view define a four-fold partition of physicalist theories. 
And within each cell of the partition, further variation is possible. 
For example, some physicalists believe that the experience of 
seeing something red normally has a distinctive, introspectible 
quality in addition to its representational content-a visual "feel," 
if you will-and that what the experience represents cannot be 
understood independently of how it feels. Others believe that a 
visual experience doesn't have intrinsic qualities, or that such 
qualities are in any case incidental to its content. Different physi- 
calists are also motivated by different intuitions about how physi- 
cally constituted colors are best identified and hence about how 
they are likely to be picked out in visual experience. Some identify 
colors as those physical properties which are common to various 
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classes of objects; they consequently treat the perception of colors 
as the recognition of physical similarities and differences.'0 Others 
identify colors as those physical properties which cause particular 
visual effects, and consequently treat color perception as the rec- 
ognition, via those effects, of their physical causes.11 
These disagreements might be thought to require further sub- 
division of physicalist territory, into eight or even sixteen regions 
instead of four. But we begin to wonder, at this point, whether all 
of the resulting regions would be occupied by theories that were 
even remotely plausible. We shall therefore proceed less abstractly, 
by developing the latter intuitions about how to identify physically 
constituted colors. Each of these intuitions could in principle lead 
to eight different theories, as it is combined with fregeanism or 
russellianism, with identity theory or realization theory, and with 
credence or skepticism about qualia. As we have suggested, how- 
ever, not all of the resulting permutations are viable. What's more, 
the lines of thought departing from these intuitions ultimately 
tend to converge. We shall therefore attempt to formulate only 
those accounts of color experience which are both plausible and 
distinct. 
The First Intuition: Similarity Classes 
One way of picking out an object as red is by saying that its sur- 
face shares a property with the surfaces of ripe tomatoes, British 
phone booths, McIntosh apples, and so on. Perhaps, then, an ob- 
ject can be visually represented as colored by being represented as 
sharing a property with certain other objects. 
But do references to phone booths and tomatoes crop up in the 
"0See J. J. C. Smart, "On Some Criticisms of a Physicalist Theory of 
Colors," in Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem, ed. Chung-ying 
Cheng (Honolulu, Hi.: University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 54-63; 
D. M. Armstrong, "Smart and the Secondary Qualities," in Metaphysics and 
Morality: Essays in Honour ofJ. J. C. Smart, ed. Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan, 
and Jean Norman (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 1-5. 
"See Jackson and Pargetter, "An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism 
About Colour." This view also appears in an unpublished manuscript by 
Sydney Shoemaker entitled "Qualities and Qualia: What's In the Mind?" 
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visual representation of objects as red? Surely, people can see 
things as red without even having the concept of a tomato or a 
phone booth. Of course, this particular problem could be circum- 
vented if each person's visual experience were conceived as char- 
acterizing red objects in terms of paradigms familiar to that 
person. But the resulting conception of visual experience would 
still be wrong, for two reasons. 
First, the experience of seeing one thing as red makes no explicit 
allusion to other instances of the color, familiar or not. No matter 
how conversant one is with tomatoes, and no matter how centrally 
tomatoes may have figured in one's acquisition of color concepts, 
seeing a red fire engine doesn't appear to be an experience about 
tomatoes. Second, visual experience never represents objects as 
having their colors necessarily or trivially, whereas it would repre- 
sent tomatoes (or some other objects) as necessarily and trivially 
red if it represented things as red by characterizing them as 
sharing a property with tomatoes (or with those other objects).'2 
The moral of these observations is not that an object's color isn't 
visually represented as a property shared with other objects; the 
moral is simply that if it is so represented, the other objects aren't 
specified individually. The possibility remains that the experience 
of an object as red represents it as sharing a property with objects 
in a set that includes tomatoes but which is specified without refer- 
ence to them or to any other individual members. 
Yet how can the appropriate set of objects be specified in the 
content of visual experience, if not in terms of its members? To 
suggest that it be specified in terms of a property characteristic of 
those members would defeat the point of the current intuition. 
The point of the intuition is that a color can be represented in 
terms of a set of objects precisely because it's the only property 
common to all members of the set. Specifying the set in terms of 
the property characteristic of its members would therefore require 
an antecedent capacity to represent the color-which would 
render specification of the set superfluous. 
'2The only way to circumvent this problem would be to suppose that the 
redness of everything but tomatoes is seen as a surface similarity to to- 
matoes, whereas the redness of tomatoes is seen as a similarity to fire en- 
gines. Yet this supposition would imply that the redness of tomatoes looks 
different from that of other objects-which is false. 
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A Humean Proposal 
Nevertheless, the intuition that an object's color is seen as a 
property shared with other objects can be preserved, with the help 
of a proposal dating back to Hume's Treatise.'3 Imagine that the 
experience of seeing an object as red has the indexical character 
"It's one of that kind," wherein the reference of "that kind" is de- 
termined by the subject's disposition, at the prompting of the ex- 
perience, to group the object together with other objects. If the 
latter objects do constitute a kind, by virtue of possessing some 
common property, then the experience will have as its content that 
the former object belongs to that kind and hence that it possesses 
the characteristic property-a property that could easily be micro- 
physical or realized microphysically. 
This account of color experience is of the liberal russellian va- 
riety, since it suggests that visual content characterizes its object as 
belonging to a kind, but that the kind in question must be specified 
by direct reference rather than by a more specific characterization. 
Direct reference is mediated in this case by a correlation between 
potential classificatory behavior of a subject, on the one hand, and 
a microphysically constituted kind of object, on the other. As we 
have seen, the proposal has no fregean version, because it requires 
specification of a kind, and no such specification can be found in 
the introspectible content of color experience. 
An Information-Theoretic Proposal 
Here is an alternative way of preserving the first intuition. 
Imagine that a particular mental symbol is regularly tokened in 
response to visual encounters with objects of a particular kind, 
whose members belong to it by virtue of possessing some charac- 
teristic property. The symbol may then qualify as indicating-and 
thus, in a sense, as referring to-the kind with which it is corre- 
lated.14 And tokenings of the symbol may consequently introduce 
13A Treatise of Human Nature, I.i.vii. This proposal may also be what 
Armstrong has in mind in some parts of A Materialist Theory of the Mind 
(London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), Chapter Twelve. 
'4A full correlational theory would identify the referent of a mental 
item not with its actual causes or correlates but, rather, with the causes or 
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its referent into the content of visual experiences, in such a way 
that objects are represented as members of the kind to which the 
symbol refers. Such an experience will naturally be described, on 
the one hand, as registering the similarity of its object to other 
members of the kind and, on the other, as attributing to its object 
the property characteristic of the kind. In a sense, then, the object 
will be seen as having a property by being visually associated with 
other objects that have it. A microphysical or microphysically re- 
alized property may thus be attributed to an object by way of the 
object's visually detected similarity to other objects.'5 
Introducing Qualia 
Now suppose that the mental correlate of a color category were 
not some item of a subliminal mentalese but, rather, an introspec- 
tible sensation or quale. To begin with, this supposition could 
simply be appended to the foregoing russellian account. The vis- 
ual sensation associated with the appearance of a particular object 
could then be treated like a numeral in a paint-by-numbers scene, 
assigning the object to a kind, and hence attributing to it an asso- 
ciated property, without characterizing the kind or property in any 
way. Which kind or property a particular sensation denoted would 
be fixed, as before, by causation or correlation.'6 
correlates that it would have under counterfactual ideal circumstances. 
Different theories propose different sets of ideal circumstances, but these 
differences needn't concern us here. We shall gloss over these issues by 
saying simply that under such a theory, a mental item refers to its normal 
or predominant cause. 
'5This account of how colors are visually represented follows the strict 
russellian line, in that it credits the mental symbol for a color with no 
meaning beyond a correlationally determined reference. There is some 
room here for liberalization. The mental symbol for red may have a very 
general sense, such as "a kind of object," and the visual representation of 
something as red may therefore characterize it, literally, as of a kind. 
Which kind is being represented, however, will still be determined by the 
symbol's reference, since this account, like the preceding one, offers no 
resources for a descriptive characterization of the kind. 
'6An identity-theoretic version of this account would say that color sen- 
sations denote microphysical properties. A realization-theoretic version 
would say that they denote higher-order properties that have micro- 
physical realizations. 
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Once the mental correlate of a color category is imagined as ac- 
cessible to introspection, however, the resources for a fregean 
theory become available. The content of a visual experience, can 
then be imagined to invoke the accompanying sensation and hence 
to characterize its object under the description "having the prop- 
erty that is this sensation's normal or predominant cause." 
Such an account of how colors are represented can be adopted 
by proponents of both identity- and realization-physicalism. An 
identity-physicalist can say that red is the property referred to 
within the proposed characterization-the property that tends to 
cause the accompanying sensation. A realization-physicalist can say 
that red is the higher-order property expressed by the entire char- 
acterization-the property of having a property that tends to 
cause the sensation. On the first reading, colors may turn out to be 
identical with microphysical properties; on the second, they may 
turn out to have microphysical realizations. 
The Second Intuition: Causes of Visual Effects 
At this point our development of the first intuition, that colors 
can be identified in terms of similarity classes, has brought us 
around to the second intuition, that colors can be identified in 
terms of their visual effects. Indeed, we have already canvassed 
the only plausible theories derivable from the latter intuition- 
namely, theories according to which colors are visually repre- 
sented by, or by reference to, visual sensations that they cause. 
We do not wish to rule out either of these possibilities entirely. How- 
ever, one realization-theoretic version of the current proposal can be ex- 
cluded in advance. This version would be the russellian counterpart of a 
fregean theory that we shall introduce below. The fregean theory says that 
visual experience characterizes each color as the higher-order property of 
having some property that tends to cause a particular color sensation. The 
russellian counterpart of this theory would say that each color sensation is 
appropriately correlated with, and hence refers to, the higher-order prop- 
erty of having a property that tends to cause it. 
The problem with the latter theory is that it would utterly trivialize the 
correlational semantics on which russellianism depends. Almost every 
property is correlated with the higher-order property of there being a 
property that tends to cause it. A semantics that allowed such a correlation 
to ground a relation of reference would be unable to draw a distinction 
between what has a reference and what doesn't. 
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These theories can be paraphrased as saying that colors are vis- 
ually represented as the properties that normally cause objects 
to look colored. But such a paraphrase will make sense only if 
looking colored is understood to consist in giving a visual appear- 
ance that's accompanied by particular visual sensations, rather 
than in being visually represented as having colors. For if colors 
were represented as the properties that normally cause objects to 
be represented as having colors, the content of color experience 
would be viciously circular. 
Now, some philosophers have denied that this circularity would 
be vicious. One philosopher has even claimed that it would be a 
virtue, in that it would account for the notorious indefinability of 
colors. Colors are indefinable, he says, precisely because their defi- 
nitions are unavoidably circular.'7 
We think, however, that the proposed circular definition would 
imply that the content of color experience is vacuous. When one 
describes an object as having properties that would cause it to be 
visually represented as red, one is describing it in terms of the ex- 
periences that it is equipped to cause, and one is describing those 
experiences in terms of their content-namely, as experiences of 
seeing the thing as red. The content of one's description therefore 
includes, as a proper part, the content of the experiences that the 
thing is described as equipped to cause; and the content of one's 
whole description depends on that component. For this reason, 
the description cannot express the content of the experiences in 
question. If the content of seeing something as red were that the 
thing was equipped to cause experiences of seeing it as red, then 
the content of seeing something as red would include and depend 
upon the content of experiences of seeing it as red. The content of 
seeing something as red would thus include and depend upon it- 
self; it would characterize the thing, in effect, as having a property 
that would cause experiences containing this very characterization; 
and hence it would fail to attribute any particular property to the 
object. Circularity in the content of color experience would render 
that content vacuous.18 
17John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," in Morality and Ob- 
jectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie, ed. Ted Honderich (London, England: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110- 129. 
'8We develop this argument at length in "Colour as a Secondary 
Quality," pp. 88-91. 
83 
BOGHOSSIAN & VELLEMAN 
Thus, the content of visually representing something as colored 
cannot be that the thing has whatever normally causes objects to be 
visually represented as colored. As we have seen, however, the 
content in question can still be that the thing has whatever nor- 
mally causes objects to look colored, in the sense that it causes their 
visual appearances to be accompanied by a color sensation. 
Outline of the Argument 
We have now developed various proposals for ways in which vis- 
ual experience might represent microphysically constituted color 
properties. We began with the Humean proposal that colors are 
directly denoted by the subject's classificatory dispositions. We 
then introduced an information-theoretic proposal, which says 
that colors are directly denoted by mental correlates, whether they 
be items of mentalese or introspectible qualia. We concluded with 
a fregean variant of the latter possibility, to the effect that colors 
are characterized descriptively as the properties that normally 
cause color sensations. 
Despite the diversity of these proposals, we think that they are 
uniformly unsuccessful in showing that visual experience might 
represent microphysical or microphysically realized colors. Each of 
them fails to satisfy one of two fundamental requirements for an 
adequate theory of color vision. 
First, we shall argue, a theory of color must respect the episte- 
mology of color experience: it must be compatible with one's 
knowing what one knows about color properties on the basis of 
Note that the circularity at issue here is significantly different from the 
circularity at issue in our earlier discussion of the expression "looks red." 
There we were concerned with a circularity that could result from the 
structure of this expression. Identifying red in terms of things' looking 
red will be circular, we argued, if "looks red" gets its reference by logical 
composition, in a way that depends on the reference of "red." Here we are 
concerned with a circularity in the content of a visual representation, irre- 
spective of which symbols bear that content or how they are structured. 
We argue that if the content of representing something as red is that the 
thing has the property that causes objects to be represented as red, then 
that content will be embedded in itself. The former circularity can easily 
be resolved, since "looks red" can be restructured as a unitary expression 
referring directly to a kind of experience. The latter circularity cannot be 
resolved by any restructuring of symbols. (See note 4.) 
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seeing them. The epistemological problem for physicalism is not 
that the microphysical nature of colors cannot be known on sight; 
it is rather that other things about colors are known on sight but 
could not be known in this way if physicalism were true. 
Second, we shall argue that a theory of color must respect the 
phenomenology of color experience: it must be compatible with 
what it's like to see the world as colored. Mere reflection on what 
it's like to see colors does not reveal whether the properties being 
seen are microphysical, but it does yield various constraints on any 
theory of what those properties are. In particular, such reflection 
reveals that color experience is naive, in that it purports to ac- 
quaint us directly with properties of external objects. In our 
opinion, no physicalist theory can meet this phenomenological 
constraint while meeting those imposed by the epistemology of 
color as well. We consider these constraints in turn, beginning with 
the epistemological. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 
What do you know about colors, not as a student of physics or 
physiology, but simply in your capacity as a subject of visual expe- 
rience? We think that you know, for example, that red and orange 
are properties; that they are different properties, though of the 
same kind-different determinants of the same determinable; 
that they are not as different from one another as they are from 
blue; and that they cannot simultaneously be instantiated in ex- 
actly the same place. Finally, you know that red and orange are 
properties that things visually appear to have, and you know when 
things appear to have them. 
All but the last two items of knowledge are necessary proposi- 
tions. Red and orange-that is, the properties that things appear 
to have in looking red and in looking orange-not only are dis- 
tinct, similar determinates of the same determinable but are essen- 
tially so. A property that wasn't a determinate of the same determi- 
nable as red, or wasn't distinct from red, or wasn't similar to red- 
such a property simply wouldn't be orange. And vice versa. 
What's more, mere reflection on color experience provides all 
the support that might ever be needed for all of the knowledge 
cited above. That is, you need only reflect on the experiences of 
seeing things as red and as orange in order to know that they are 
two distinct, incompatible, but rather similar determinates of a 
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single determinable property; you need only reflect on particular 
experiences in order to tell which of these properties they repre- 
sent; and there are no possible circumstances under which more 
evidence would be needed. We wish to remain neutral on the ex- 
planation for this phenomenon. The knowledge in question may 
be delivered in its entirety by introspection on the contents of the 
relevant experiences. Alternatively, it may require the recognition 
of relations among the contents of these experiences, so long as 
the relations are such as can be recognized a priori. It may even 
require empirical support, so long as the support required is no 
more than what's provided by the experiences themselves. All we 
claim is that the experiences of seeing red and orange provide 
whatever is necessary for this rudimentary knowledge about those 
properties. 
Consider the consequences of denying that your knowledge 
about colors has this status. If the experiences of seeing red and 
orange didn't provide all of the support required for the knowl- 
edge that they're distinct but similar determinates of the same de- 
terminable, then your knowledge of these matters would be hos- 
tage to future empirical discoveries. You would have to consider 
the possibility of obtaining evidence that red and orange are in fact 
the same property or, conversely, that they aren't similar at all. 
And given how the references of "red" and "orange" are fixed, 
evidence that red and orange are the same property, for example, 
would amount to evidence that the property that objects appear to 
have in looking red is the same as the property that they appear to 
have in looking orange. 
Does visual experience leave room for the hypothesis that things 
appear to have the same property in looking red as they do in 
looking orange? We think not. Nor does it leave room for the hy- 
pothesis that red and orange are less alike than red and blue, or 
that something seemingly seen as red on a particular occasion is 
being represented as having a property other than red. Your 
knowledge on these matters is such that nothing would count as 
evidence against it. 
Meeting the Epistemological Constraints 
Yet would such knowledge be possible if physicalism were true? 
We believe that the answer may be yes in the case of fregean 
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realization-physicalism, but that in the case of all other versions of 
physicalism-that is, russellian theories and identity theories-the 
answer is no. 
What sets the latter theories apart from fregean realization- 
physicalism is their implication that visual experiences like yours 
represent colors only as a matter of contingent fact. Under the 
terms of these theories, an experience internally indistinguishable 
from your experience of seeing something as red might fail to rep- 
resent its object as having that color. The reason is that red is rep- 
resented by your experience, according to these theories, only by 
virtue of facts incidental to the internal features of the experience. 
Which facts these are depends on the physicalist's conception of 
visual representation. Under the terms of russellianism, they are 
the causal or correlational facts by virtue of which some mental 
item, or some behavioral disposition, introduces the microphysi- 
cally constituted property red into the contents of experiences. 
Twin-earth examples, in the style of Putnam,19 will readily demon- 
strate that the same mental item or the same classificatory behavior 
might have been correlated with objects of a different kind, 
sharing a different property-in which case, internally similar ex- 
periences would not have represented the property that, ac- 
cording to physicalism, is red. 
Under the terms of fregeanism, the facts in virtue of which vis- 
ual experience represents a microphysical property are the facts 
in virtue of which instances of that property uniquely satisfy the 
characterization by which things are visually represented as red. 
And these facts, too, are bound to be contingent if red is identical 
with a microphysical property, for reasons illuminated by the naive 
objection discussed above. Although the naive objection cannot 
defeat physicalism, it does force the fregean identity-physicalist to 
concede that the characterization by which things are visually rep- 
resented as red does not represent what it is to be red. For as an 
identity-physicalist, he believes that to be red is to have a particular 
microphysical property, and yet the objection forces him to con- 
'9Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Mind, Language, and 
Reality (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975); see also 
Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," in Studies in Metaphysics, ed. 
P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis, Minn.: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1979). 
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cede that things aren't seen under microphysical characterizations. 
The fregean identity-physicalist must therefore believe that things 
are seen as red by means of a contingent characterization-a char- 
acterization that is, in fact, uniquely satisfied by instances of the 
property red, but not because it represents what redness is. And 
twin-earth examples will once again demonstrate that such a char- 
acterization might not have been uniquely satisfied by instances of 
red or might have been uniquely satisfied by instances of another 
property. Just as a mental symbol might have tracked a different 
property, so the visual characterization "whatever causes this 
feeling" might have been satisfied by a different property; and in 
either case, your visual experiences wouldn't have represented 
red, under the terms of the corresponding theory. 
Thus, fregean identity-physicalism is like russellian physicalism 
in implying that your experience of something's looking red might 
have been exactly as it is, in all respects internal to you, while 
failing to represent anything as red. And this consequence has the 
corollary that there are circumstances under which you couldn't 
tell, by mere reflection on the experience of something's looking 
red, whether it is being represented as having the property red. 
The physicalist may object, at this point, that something's being 
contingent doesn't entail its being a posteriori. He will argue, more 
specifically, that the reference of "red" has been fixed for you by a 
description alluding to your visual experiences: red is, by stipula- 
tion, whatever property is attributed to objects by their looking 
red. That red is the property that something appears to have in 
looking red is therefore knowable a priori, even though it is contin- 
gent, just like the length of the standard meter-bar in Paris.20 
20See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), pp. 54ff. 
Of course, those who define "red" as synonymous with "the property 
attributed to an object by its looking red" will think that it is not only 
necessary but analytic that red is the property something appears to have 
when it looks red. They will therefore claim that their view is compatible 
with your ability to tell that something appears to be red, since things 
necessarily appear to be red whenever they look red, and a thing's looking 
red is (by stipulation) an introspectively recognizable kind of experience. 
True enough. But what these philosophers describe as the ability to tell 
that something appears to be red is less than meets the ear. It's the ability 
to tell that whatever property the thing appears to have is to be called red 
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This response misses the epistemological point. The term "red" 
has been stipulated as denoting the property attributed to objects 
by their looking red; but the phrase "looks red" has been stipu- 
lated as denoting experiences introspectively similar to some para- 
digm experience. The problem is that under the terms of the theo- 
ries now in question, there is no introspectively recognizable kind 
of experience for which you can always tell by introspection 
whether the same property is represented in all or most experi- 
ences of that kind. These theories therefore imply, to begin with, 
that, for all you know by reflection on visual experience, the at- 
tempt to fix the referent of "red" as the property attributed to 
objects by their looking red may have failed, since there may be no 
property that predominantly satisfies that description. They imply 
furthermore that, even if there is a property represented by most 
instances of things' looking red, you cannot necessarily tell by re- 
flection when a particular experience is representing that prop- 
erty. 
This problem can best be illustrated by imaginary cases of 
context-switching.21 Suppose that your environment were to 
change in such a way that your mental designator for red was cor- 
related with, or your visual characterization of red was satisfied by, 
a new and different property that replaced the current property 
red wherever it occurred. At first the content of your visual expe- 
riences might remain the same, with the result that you saw objects 
as having a property that they no longer had. But gradually your 
visual designators or characterizations would come to denote the 
new property rather than the old. Tomatoes would therefore ap- 
pear to have a new and different color property-appear to have 
it, that is, in the only sense in which a russellian or an identity- 
theorist can conceive of them as appearing to have any color at all. 
Yet in all respects internal to you, your experiences would remain 
on this occasion. It's not the ability to tell when something appears to have 
that property. 
Our claim that you can tell when something appears to be red means 
that there is a property, red, such that you can tell when something ap- 
pears to have it. And this claim cannot be accommodated by these lin- 
guistic maneuvers. 
21Context-switching and its relevance to self-knowledge is discussed at 
greater length in Paul A. Boghossian, "Content and Self-Knowledge," 
Philosophical Topics (1989), pp. 5-26. 
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unchanged, and so you would be unable to tell by reflection that 
you were no longer seeing tomatoes as having the color property 
that you had previously seen them as having. 
Russellianism and identity-physicalism therefore entail that 
without investigation into the physical causes and correlates of 
your visual experiences, you cannot necessarily know whether to- 
matoes appear today to have a different color property from the 
one that they once appeared to have. You might know that what- 
ever property they appear to have is likely to be the current holder 
of the title "red," if any property is. But you may not be able to tell 
when things have appeared to have that property in the past; and 
you may not be able to tell in the future when things appear to 
have it. Hence there remains a significant sense in which you don't 
necessarily know when things appear to be red.22 
Indeed, these theories entail that you cannot always tell without 
investigation whether objects appear to have any color properties 
at all. For just as experiences internally indistinguishable from 
yours might represent different properties, so too they might 
simply fail to represent properties. Such a failure would occur if 
the characterizations applied to objects in visual experience were 
not satisfied, or if the corresponding mental designators were not 
systematically correlated with visual stimulation from objects of 
any particular kind. 
Consider the russellian theories, which say that visual experi- 
ence represents objects as colored by means of symbols or be- 
havioral dispositions that designate microphysically constituted 
kinds. Reflection on such an experience wouldn't necessarily re- 
veal whether the symbols being tokened, or the behavior being 
22This problem is especially acute for the Humean proposal, according 
to which objects are represented as colored by being characterized as "one 
of those," where the reference of "those" is determined by the subject's 
classificatory dispositions. Not only would one be unable to tell by intro- 
spection whether the property characteristic of a particular set of objects 
was the same as it was previously; one would also be unable to tell whether 
an object was being assigned to the same set of objects as it was previously. 
In order to tell whether the set to which tomatoes were visually assigned 
today was the same as the one to which they were assigned yesterday, one 
would have to investigate precisely which other objects one was disposed 
to include in that set on each occasion. Mere introspection would there- 
fore fall even further short of revealing whether tomatoes appear to have 
the same color that they once appeared to have. 
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prompted, were correlated with objects sharing a common prop- 
erty and constituting a genuine kind. For all one could tell from 
having the experience, the objects associated with the symbol or 
behavior might be utterly miscellaneous, and so these purported 
designators might not indicate membership in a kind or possession 
of a property. Hence one would be unable to tell, when things 
looked red, whether there was a property that they thereby ap- 
peared to have. And if one didn't know whether things appeared 
to have a property in looking red, one wouldn't know whether 
there was such a property as red at all. 
The same problem attends the fregean theory, in all but 
its realization-theoretic form. According to fregean identity- 
physicalism, as we have developed it, visual experience represents 
red by characterizing it as the property that normally causes a par- 
ticular sensation. Yet reflection on a visual representation of this 
form would not necessarily reveal whether there was a property 
that normally caused the sensation, and so it wouldn't reveal 
whether the associated characterization succeeded in denoting a 
property. 
Of course, the possibility of there being no colors represented in 
visual experience is only the most bizarre of many possibilities that 
introspection could not rule out if the present theories were true. 
A less bizarre possibility is that visual experience might represent 
only two color properties-one when things look either red, or- 
ange, or yellow, and another when they look either green, blue, or 
violet. The correlational or causal facts could certainly be arranged 
in such a way as to give these experiences one of only two contents, 
under the terms of russellian or identity-theoretic physicalism. 
These theories therefore imply that one cannot always tell without 
investigation whether red and orange are different colors, the 
same color, or no color at all. 
Some Defenses and Replies 
Now, physicalists sometimes admit that visual experience, as 
they conceive it, is compatible with the possibility that there are no 
colors.23 We wonder, however, whether the full import of this con- 
cession is generally appreciated. The statement that there may be 
23See, for example, Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, p. 289. 
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no colors sounds as if it should gladden the heart of an anti-realist, 
but it is in fact different from, and perhaps even incompatible 
with, the views that many anti-realists hold. What these anti-realists 
believe is that colors are properties that visual experience at- 
tributes to objects even though no objects instantiate them. What 
proponents of the present theories must concede, however, is that 
there may be no properties attributed to objects by their looking 
colored, and hence that there may be no such properties as colors, 
not even uninstantiated ones. They must allow that color experi- 
ence not only may attribute properties to objects that don't have 
them, as the anti-realists claim, but may actually fail to attribute 
properties to objects at all, by failing to express any properties. If 
this possibility were realized, color experience would lack the rep- 
resentational competence required to be false, strictly speaking, 
whereas the falsity of color experience is what anti-realism is 
usually about. And in our opinion, the fact that color experience 
can at least be false is evident on the face of it. 
A physicalist might respond that the designators and charac- 
terizations involved in color experience can be assumed to indicate 
some properties, since something or other is bound to be respon- 
sible for one's visual sensations, as specified in the characteriza- 
tions, and something or other is bound to be correlated with the 
designators. But the liberal criteria of visual representation that 
would enable one to assume that some properties or other were 
being represented would simultaneously undermine one's claim to 
other items of knowledge about those properties.24 For if one's 
experiences of things as red and as orange represented whatever 
properties in heaven or earth were correlated with two different 
designators, or responsible for two different sensations, then one 
would be even less able to tell by reflection whether those proper- 
ties belonged to the same determinable, or required extension for 
their instantiation, or bore greater similarity to one another than 
to some third property. For all one could tell from seeing colors in 
the way imagined here, red might be an electrical charge, orange a 
degree of acidity, and blue a texture. 
A physicalist might respond that if the similarities and differ- 
24Such liberal criteria are also unlikely to yield a plausible theory of rep- 
resentation. But as we said in note 8, we are ignoring such general 
problems in correlational semantics. 
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ences among colors were conceived as relative to an observer, then 
they would indeed be revealed by reflection on visual experi- 
ence.25 Let the imperfect similarity between red and orange consist 
in the fact that they have distinct but similar effects on normal 
human observers, and any normal human observer will be able to 
detect their relation on sight. 
The problem with this suggestion is that it can account only for 
our knowledge of contingent similarities and differences. Red and 
orange, as conceived by the physicalist, are properties that happen 
to have distinct but similar effects on human observers, but they 
might have had effects that were not distinct or were even less 
similar. Hence the similarity relation that would be accessible by 
reflection on visual experience, according to physicalism, is a rela- 
tion that red and orange might not have had. In reality, however, 
reflection on the experiences of seeing red and orange tells us that 
if two properties didn't stand in precisely this relation, they 
wouldn't be the properties we're seeing.26 
Smart's Analogy 
Now, the epistemology of color similarities and differences has 
received considerable attention from some physicalists who are 
aware that their theories appear unable to account for it. Because 
these physicalists subscribe to russellian or identity-theoretic ver- 
sions of physicalism, they are committed to the proposition that 
visual experience doesn't characterize objects in terms that would 
reveal wherein their color properties consist. The problem is that 
if visual experience doesn't reveal wherein colors consist, it cannot 
reveal wherein they are essentially alike or different. In order for 
visual experience to represent how being red is essentially similar 
or dissimilar to being orange, it would have to represent what it is 
to be red or to be orange-which it doesn't do, under the terms of 
the theories in question. These theories therefore seem unable to 
explain why the similarities and differences among colors can be 
known on sight. 
25We owe this suggestion to Sydney Shoemaker. 
26Here, as elsewhere, a physicalist may reply that our sense of having 
introspective knowledge can be explained away. We shall consider this 
objection below. 
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Physicalists have attempted to meet this challenge by disputing 
its premise-namely, that visual experience would have to repre- 
sent the nature of color properties in order to reveal their similar- 
ities and differences. They insist upon "the possibility of being able 
to report that one thing is like another, without being able to state 
the respect in which it is like."27 
J. J. C. Smart once offered an analogy to illustrate this possi- 
bility. He wrote: 
If we think cybernetically about the nervous system we can envisage it 
as being able to respond to certain likenesses ... without being able to 
do more. It would be easier to build a machine which would tell us, 
say on a punched tape, whether or not ... objects were similar, than it 
would be to build a machine which would report wherein the simi- 
larities consisted. 
David Armstrong quotes this passage in application to color simi- 
larities and concludes, "No epistemological problem, then."28 
What Armstrong seems to be suggesting is that one detects the 
bare fact that red and orange are similar by means of a sensory 
mechanism that responds to their similarity and produces an 
awareness of it in one's mind. This similarity-detecting component 
of the visual sensorium is what corresponds, in Armstrong's view, 
to the similarity-detecting machine described by Smart.29 Unfortu- 
nately, such a detector, though perfectly conceivable, would not 
yield the right sort of knowledge about color similarities. For if the 
similarities among colors were detected by sight, then one's knowl- 
edge of them would be defeasible, by evidence of an optical illu- 
sion or malfunction. The experience of seeing things as red and as 
orange would reveal that these colors looked similar, and hence 
that they were similar if one's eyes could be trusted; but one would 
27These words are from J. J. C. Smart's "Sensations and Brain Pro- 
cesses." They are quoted in application to color by D. M. Armstrong in 
"Smart and the Secondary Qualities," p. 12. 
28"Smart and the Secondary Qualities," pp. 12-13. 
29See Armstrong's A Theory of Universals, vol. 2 (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 127: "[W]hy should not the colour- 
properties act on our mind (or, rather, why should not states of affairs 
involving these properties act on our mind), producing awareness of re- 
semblance and incompatibility, but not producing awareness of those fea- 
tures of the properties from which the resemblance and incompatibility 
flow?" 
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have to acknowledge the possibility that their apparent similarity 
might be an illusion, and that they might not be similar, after all. 
In reality, of course, the similarity between red and orange is 
known beyond question and could not turn out to be an illusion. 
One needs to have seen red and orange in order to know that 
they're similar, of course, but only because one needs to have seen 
them in order to know which properties they are. Once acquainted 
with them, one doesn't depend on visual evidence for one's knowl- 
edge of their similarity, since nothing would count as counter- 
vailing evidence. 
Armstrong's Analogy 
Armstrong has suggested that one's ability to perceive color 
similarities without perceiving their bases is analogous to the ability 
to perceive family resemblances: 
How can we be aware of the resemblance and the incompatibility of 
the colour-shades, yet be unaware of, and have to infer, the nature of 
the colour-properties from which these features flow? The answer, I 
take it, is in principle the same . . . as for the cases where resemblance 
of particulars such as faces is observed but the respect of resemblance 
cannot be made out. Despite the fact that the respect in which the 
faces resemble one another is not identified, it can still act upon our 
mind, producing in us an awareness of resemblance.30 
Now, if we follow Armstrong's instructions to interpret this 
analogy as comparing the perceived similarity of color properties 
to the perceived similarity of particular faces, then it does nothing 
to overcome our stated objection. Although one can often see that 
two faces are alike, one remains aware that the appearance of like- 
ness may be illusory, and hence that the faces may turn out not to 
be alike, after all, whereas the appearance of similarity between 
red and orange is not subject to empirical refutation. 
Yet Armstrong's analogy is open to a slightly different interpre- 
tation, which might seem to suggest a case in which knowledge of 
bare resemblance need not be defeasible, either. Let the similarity 
30A Theory of Universals, vol. 2, p. 127. See also A Materialist Theory of the 
Mind, pp. 275-276. 
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between colors be compared not to that between particular faces 
but, rather, to that between the contours that the faces appear to 
have, which are properties rather than particulars.31 When the 
perception of family resemblance is thus interpreted as the per- 
ception of similarity between complex shapes, it no longer seems 
exposed to the risk of illusion. The faces may not have the shapes 
that they appear to have, of course, but the similarity between 
those shapes remains unmistakable, even though one may not be 
able to articulate the respects in which they're alike. Why, then, 
can't the similarity between perceived colors be equally unmistak- 
able and yet equally unanalyzable? 
The problem with this version of Armstrong's analogy is that 
one's ignorance of the respects in which perceived shapes are alike 
is not analogous to the ignorance that one would have of color 
similarities if russellian or identity-theoretic physicalism were true. 
Although one cannot say what's common to the contours that two 
faces appear to have, one sees those contours under modes of pre- 
sentation that represent their nature, since shapes are spatial prop- 
erties and are visually characterized in spatial terms.32 Information 
about the aspects in which shapes are similar is therefore included 
in the introspectible content of their visual appearance. One may 
just be unable to isolate that information or extract it or put it into 
words. Under the terms of russellianism or identity-physicalism, 
however, one's inability to tell what colors have in common isn't 
due to the difficulty of processing information contained in their 
visual characterization; it's due to the absence of that information, 
since colors aren't characterized in terms that represent their na- 
ture. 
The difference between these cases is like that between purely 
referential concepts, which have no sense, and concepts whose 
sense is difficult to explicate. If one has the concept of gold 
3'Armstrong himself sometimes suggests that shapes rather than indi- 
viduals are the relevant analogue. See Consciousness and Causality, pp. 
178-179. 
320ne might well have reservations about whether the spatial terms in 
which shapes are visually characterized fully capture their spatial nature. 
But such reservations tend to undermine Armstrong's claim that simi- 
larities of shape are evident on sight. In assuming that shapes are visually 
represented in terms that reveal their nature, we are simply taking Arm- 
strong's view of the matter. 
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without being able to say what gold is, the reason may be that 
having the concept consists in nothing more than standing in the 
right causal relation to the appropriate objects. But if one has the 
concept of compassion without being able to say what compassion 
is, the reason is probably that one's concept has a de dicto content 
that one cannot immediately explicate. Thus, reflection on one's 
concepts of compassion and pity may not reveal how compassion 
and pity are alike, any more than reflection on concepts will reveal 
the relation between gold and silver-but not for the same reason. 
In the case of gold and silver, the reason will be that one's concepts 
simply don't reflect the basis of similarity; in the case of compas- 
sion and pity, it will be that a relation reflected in one's concepts 
isn't easy to articulate. 
This difference is manifested by differences in one's authority 
about proposed accounts of the relevant objects or similarities. If 
someone proposes an account of what gold is, or how it is like 
silver, one cannot confirm his account simply by consulting one's 
concepts. But if someone proposes an account of what compassion 
is, or how it is like pity, reflection on one's concepts may indeed 
suffice to reveal whether he's right, even if it wouldn't have en- 
abled one to formulate the account on one's own. 
To judge by this test, the visual representation of shape is like a 
concept that's difficult to explicate, since one can indeed confirm 
an account of the resemblance between two faces by reflecting on 
how they look. There is thus good reason to believe that one's 
knowledge of family resemblance depends on visual information 
of a sort that is not contained in the appearance of colors, as un- 
derstood by russellian or identity-theoretic physicalism. One does 
see the respects in which two faces are alike, although one may be 
unable to isolate or describe them, whereas the versions of physi- 
calism under discussion imply that the respects of similarity be- 
tween colors are utterly invisible. Hence one's ability to be certain 
about family resemblances is no indication that one could be 
equally certain about color resemblances if these versions of physi- 
calism were true. 
Explaining the Epistemological Intuitions Away 
We believe that the foregoing epistemological objections rule 
out any theory that portrays visual experience as representing 
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colors contingently-that is, without characterizations that denote 
them necessarily. They thereby rule out russellian versions of 
physicalism and fregean identity-physicalism as well. 
Although such theories cannot respect ordinary intuitions about 
the epistemology of color, some of them can attempt to explain 
those intuitions away. In particular, any physicalist who acknowl- 
edges the existence of distinctive color sensations, or qualia, can 
argue that we have mistaken introspective knowledge about those 
sensations for knowledge about the color properties that they help 
to represent. What the ordinary observer knows by reflection, this 
physicalist may claim, is not that there are distinct but similar 
properties that red-looking and orange-looking objects appear to 
have but, rather, that there are distinct but similar sensations that 
accompany these appearances. According to this response, we 
have displaced-indeed, projected-these items of knowledge 
from their true objects, which are color qualia, onto color proper- 
ties. 
But can the physicalist extend this explanation to our most fun- 
damental knowledge claim, that color experience can be known on 
reflection to represent properties? He can try. For he can say that 
we have mistaken the introspectible presence of color qualia in vis- 
ual experience for an introspectible representation of color prop- 
erties. Because reflection on visual experience does reveal that 
things look colored in the sense that their visual appearances are 
accompanied by color sensations, the physicalist may argue, we 
have mistaken it as revealing that they look colored in the sense of 
being represented as having color properties. 
But why would we commit this mistake in the case of color, when 
we have no tendency to commit it in the cases of other, equally 
vivid sensations? One isn't tempted to think that sensations of pain, 
for example, attribute any properties to the objects that cause 
them. Reflection on the experience of being pricked by a pin 
doesn't yield the conviction that the pin is being represented as 
having a pain-property. Why, then, should reflection on an expe- 
rience accompanied by a color sensation yield the conviction that 
its object is being represented as colored? 
Here again the physicalist may think that he has an explanation. 
For as Wittgenstein pointed out, sensations of pain, unlike sensa- 
tions of red, are not regularly received from particular objects or 
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surfaces; if they were, "we should speak of pain-patches just as at 
present we speak of red patches."33 Perhaps, then, we believe that 
visual experience attributes color properties to objects because 
we've observed the regularity with which color sensations are asso- 
ciated with the perception of particular surfaces. According to this 
explanation, the knowledge that we have claimed to possess on the 
basis of mere reflection is in fact derived from observed patterns 
and correlations within visual experience.34 
Unfortunately, the patterns and correlations cited here would 
provide no grounds whatsoever for believing that visual experi- 
ence attributes color properties to objects in the ways required by 
russellian or identity-theoretic physicalism. From the fact that par- 
ticular objects are individually associated in visual experience with 
a particular sensation, no conclusion can be drawn about whether 
the sensation has any normal or predominant cause, and hence 
about whether there is an external property that it can help to 
represent. Various objects regularly occasion sensations of red, but 
those objects are so various that they may not have any surface 
properties in common, for all one can tell from visual experience. 
Hence their observed association with one and the same quale 
provides no grounds for thinking that the quale has any informa- 
tional potential. 
What's more, the association of color sensations with particular 
objects is no more regular or reliable than that of pain with partic- 
ular kinds of events. After all, pain serves its monitory function 
only because young children can learn that it regularly accompa- 
nies bumps, scrapes, punctures, encounters with extreme heat or 
cold, and so forth. Having obvious external correlates is essential 
to the evolutionary purpose of pain. If what led us to view a sensa- 
tion as the representation of something external were its observed 
correlation with various external stimuli, we would have no more 
occasion to take this view of color than of pain. 
Thus, the point of Wittgenstein's remark about pain patches 
cannot be that pain appears to have no representational content 
because it has no apparent external correlates. What, then, is the 
33Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p. 
312. 
34This suggestion, too, is due to Sydney Shoemaker. 
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point? Surely, it's that sensations like pain (and color) involve 
qualities that we can easily think of as located in the external 
world, but that this thought is blocked, in the case of pain, by there 
being no particular places where it seems to be located. The ex- 
ternal correlates of pain aren't places, and so pain isn't subject to 
the sort of displacement that the mind practices on other sensa- 
tions. 
Thus, what the association of sensations with particular surfaces 
produces, and what Wittgenstein was suggesting that it would pro- 
duce even in the case of pain, is a tendency to perceive the sensa- 
tions as located on those surfaces-an inducement, in short, to the 
projective error. But the result of this error is precisely that the 
qualia themselves, rather than microphysical properties, are attrib- 
uted to objects in visual experience. Thus, if the patterns cited by 
the physicalist have their most likely result, they result in the falsity 
of physicalism as an account of the properties that visual experi- 
ence represents. 
The physicalist explanation of our basic epistemological intui- 
tion is therefore unstable. The physicalist wishes to claim that vis- 
ual experience does not project sensations onto external objects, 
as their perceived properties, but that reflection on visual experi- 
ence does project our knowledge about sensations onto objects, as 
knowledge about their perceived properties. What is cited as ac- 
counting for the latter projection doesn't really account for it, how- 
ever, and would in fact account for the former projection instead. 
FREGEAN, REALIZATION-THEORETIc THEORIES 
Russellian and identity-theoretic versions of physicalism fail to 
cope with the epistemology of color because they must portray vis- 
ual experience as representing color without a characterization 
that denotes it necessarily. Such visual representations would de- 
note properties only contingently, and would therefore fail to pro- 
vide the appropriate introspective knowledge of the properties de- 
noted. 
This problem does not affect fregean, realization-theoretic theo- 
ries. A realization-physicalist can concede, in response to the naive 
objection, that red objects aren't visually characterized in micro- 
physical terms, and yet hold a version of fregeanism according to 
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which they are characterized in terms that express what it is to be 
red; for he doesn't believe that to be red is to have a microphysical 
property. His theory of visual representation may then enable him 
to account for the epistemology of color experience. For if visual 
experience represented red by means of a characterization that 
represented what it is to be red, then introspection on the content 
of such an experience would leave no doubt whether there was 
such a property, introspection on experiences containing the same 
characterization would leave no doubt whether they represented 
the same property, and introspection on experiences containing 
characterizations of various colors would reveal the relations of 
similarity among them-all because the introspectible content of 
each experience would reveal what it is to have the property 
therein represented. 
We therefore turn to a consideration of fregean, realization- 
theoretic versions of physicalism. One such theory was already in- 
troduced, in our initial survey of physicalist theories. Before re- 
turning to that theory, however, we shall briefly introduce a new 
proposal, which is motivated by epistemological arguments of the 
sort considered above. This proposal has little intuitive appeal of 
its own; indeed, it would hardly have been intelligible before our 
epistemological arguments against the other proposals had been 
aired. As a response to those arguments, however, it has some ap- 
parent plausibility. 
A New Proposal 
The new proposal is an attempt to kill two birds with one 
stone.35 It purports to explain at a stroke how colors are visually 
35The following remarks of Armstrong's sound like the theory devel- 
oped in this section: 
The vital point to grasp here, I think, is that, with an exception or two to be 
noticed, our concepts of the individual secondary qualities are quite empty. 
Consider the colour red. The concept of red does not yield any necessary 
connection between redness and the surface of ripe Jonathan apples or any 
other sort of object. It does not yield any necessary connection between red- 
ness and any sort of discriminatory behaviour, or capacity for discriminatory 
behaviour, in us or in other creatures. It does not yield any necessary connec- 
tion between redness and the way that the presence of redness is detected 
(eyes, etc.) in us or in other creatures. Finally, and most importantly, it does 
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represented and how their similarities and differences are known. 
The explanation is that colors are visually characterized precisely 
as those properties which bear the appropriate similarities and dif- 
ferences to one another. 
How could all of the similarities and differences among colors be 
included in their visual characterization? Here is how. 
Let a pigmentation be any property of extended things that stands 
with its co-determinates in relations of similarity and difference 
representable by a spheroid space in which distance around the 
circumference, distance from the ends, and distance from the in- 
terior correspond to differences in three different respects (to be 
called, for our purposes, hue, lightness, and saturation). Then let 
coordinates be defined so that any determinate pigmentation can 
be labelled by three numbers specifying its longitude, latitude, and 
depth in the property space. The description "pigmentation xyz" 
will then have as its condition of satisfaction the presence of a de- 
terminate whose relation to its co-determinates corresponds to po- 
sition xyz in a property space of this structure. 
Now suppose that visual experience characterized surfaces as hav- 
ing pigmentations, specified by their coordinates in pigmentation- 
space.36 Under the terms of fregeanism, such experiences would 
represent the surfaces as having some appropriately related deter- 
minates of some appropriately structured determinable. Under 
the terms of realization-physicalism, colors would be the second- 
order properties expressed by such characterizations-that is, the 
not yield any necessary connection between red objects and any sort of percep- 
tual experience, such as looking red to normal perceivers in normal viewing 
conditions. 
There may be a conceptual connection between redness and extended- 
ness.... There is certainly a conceptual connection between redness and the 
other colours: the complex resemblances and differences that the colours have 
to each other. But these conceptual connections do not enable us to break out 
of the circle of the colours ("Smart and the Secondary Qualities," p. 11). 
However, the rest of Armstrong's work makes clear that he does not sub- 
scribe to the theory developed here. In A Theory of Universals, vol. 2, he 
attributes such a theory to R. W. Church (pp. 108-111). 
36The use of numerical coordinates is not essential to this conception of 
color experience. Visual experience can be conceived as locating colors in 
the property space directly, without the use of coordinates; or it can be 
conceived as locating them in a network of similarity relations, without the 
use of any spatial analogy at all. 
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properties of having appropriately related determinates of an ap- 
propriately structured determinable. 
We believe that this version of the proposal can account for all of 
the knowledge claimed in our epistemological intuitions. Reflec- 
tion on the visual characterization of objects as having pigmenta- 
tions xyz and qrs would yield the appropriate knowledge about the 
higher-order properties that the objects were thereby seen as 
having. That is, it would reveal that the experience represented its 
objects as having genuine, co-determinate properties, properties 
identical to those represented by internally similar experiences 
and differing from one another in degrees proportionate to x-q, 
y-r, and z-s. One would therefore know when one was seeing 
things as red or orange, and one would be able to tell their simi- 
larities and differences. 
Unfortunately, this remedy for earlier epistemological problems 
only creates new ones. Once all of the requisite information has 
been encoded into the proposed visual characterization of colors, 
the resulting proposal-in any version-credits the subject of that 
experience with too much knowledge rather than too little. For it 
implies that the characterization of any one color encompasses that 
color's relations to all of the others, by locating it in a fully con- 
ceived color space. If color experience conformed to this proposal, 
the difference between red and orange would not only be evident 
from the experiences of seeing red and orange; it would be evi- 
dent from the experience of seeing red alone, since that experi- 
ence, by representing red as located in a property space of a par- 
ticular shape, would already intimate the locations of co- 
determinate properties. The characterization of something as 
having a property located at longitude x, latitude y, and depth z in 
a space of co-determinate properties would already suggest the lo- 
cation of properties to the north or south, properties to the east or 
west, and properties above or below. Yet the experience of seeing 
something as red does not by itself reveal that the property now in 
view has a yellower neighbor (orange) and a bluer neighbor 
(violet), nor that it has more or less bright and more or less satu- 
rated neighbors, either. The current proposal has the unfortunate 
consequence that to see one color is, in a sense, to see them all.37 
37A proponent of this theory may reply that the complete conception of 
color space may be acquired gradually, as the subject of visual experience 
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The current proposal thus continues to get the epistemology of 
color wrong. 
The Initial Fregean, Realization-Theoretic Proposal 
We therefore return to the initial candidate for a fregean, 
realization-theoretic version of physicalism. This was the theory 
that objects are visually characterized as having properties that 
normally cause color sensations, and that colors are the higher- 
order properties expressed by these characterizations.38 
The content that this theory assigns to visual experience, say, of 
red would be introspectively recognizable as representing a 
genuine property; for even if there is no property that's predomi- 
nantly responsible for sensations of red, the property of having 
such a property is undoubtedly genuine. Furthermore, any inter- 
nally similar experience would be introspectively recognizable as 
representing the same (higher-order) property, by virtue of con- 
encounters new colors. But this reply isn't to the point, because our objec- 
tion is not especially about the acquisition of color concepts. What refutes 
the present theory of color representation is not just that someone who 
has never seen orange cannot derive the concept of it from seeing red. It's 
also that someone who has seen both red and orange still does not have 
experiences of either color that, by themselves, would ground knowledge 
about the other. 
What's more, the most plausible account of how a naive subject might 
discover color space is not compatible with the proposal under considera- 
tion. For according to the proposal, either one already sees colors in 
terms of their locations in a space of co-determinates-in which case the 
appearance of one color already alludes to the others-or one doesn't yet 
see colors in terms of their locations in color space-in which case, their 
appearances furnish no grounds for drawing the similarities and differ- 
ences constitutive of such a space. One colored surface will appear to 
differ from another along three dimensions, according to the proposal, 
only if each surface is already seen under characterizations specifying 
three coordinates for its pigmentation. Hence the proposal doesn't allow 
for the possibility of discovering the dimensions of color space on the basis of 
what is seen in color experience. If one doesn't already see colors under 
characterizations locating them in such a space, then one sees nothing on 
the basis of which locations could be assigned to them. 
38Whether one regards realization-physicalism as equivalent to disposi- 
tionalism will depend on one's views on the relation between dispositions 
and their bases. For a dispositionalist theory of color that may be equiva- 
lent to realization-physicalism, see Christopher Peacocke, "Colour Con- 
cepts and Colour Experience," Synthese 58 (1984), pp. 365-381. 
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training the same characterization. And color properties, so de- 
fined, would stand in relations of similarity and difference gener- 
ated by similarities and differences among the associated sensa- 
tions. If one visual sensation differed from another in various 
respects, then the properties of being equipped to cause those sen- 
sations would differ isomorphically, by differing as to the sensa- 
tions caused. Reflection on how it feels to see things as red and as 
orange would therefore be sufficient to reveal similarities and dif- 
ferences among those colors. 
This fregean, realization-theoretic version of physicalism can 
therefore account for our knowledge of colors. Unfortunately, it 
does so at the expense of misrepresenting the phenomenology of 
color experience. 
The present theory implies that the content of visual experience 
alludes to color qualia as properties distinct from the perceived 
colors of objects.39 In order for one to see an object as having the 
property that causes visual experiences with a particular feel, one's 
experience would have to represent that feel as well as the prop- 
erty causing it. And one's experience would then lack the naivete 
characteristic of vision. 
Visual experience is naive in the sense that it doesn't distinguish 
between the perceived properties of objects and the properties of 
perceptions. Whereas the experience of pain, for example, distin- 
guishes between an external cause (a pin's sharpness) and its sen- 
sory effect (a finger's pain), visual experience does not distinguish 
between color as it is in the object and as it feels to the eye: one 
feels sharp points as causing pains but one doesn't see colored sur- 
faces as causing visual feels. The normal experience of seeing an 
object as red no more alludes to a sensation as distinct from the 
object's redness than it does to tomatoes or fire engines. 
Thus, the only version of physicalism that gets the epistemology 
of color experience right gets the phenomenology wrong. In our 
opinion, any version of physicalism that acknowledges color qualia 
will commit the same phenomenological error, since it will imply 
that visual experience always has introspectible color qualities over 
and above the color properties that it attributes to objects. But this 
39The following argument is developed more fully in "Colour as a Sec- 
ondary Quality," pp. 94-96. 
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general thesis need not be defended here, since the only version of 
the second proposal that has survived our epistemological argu- 
ments is the fregean, realization-theoretic version, which portrays 
visual experience not only as having introspectible qualities but 
also as alluding to them in its representational content. This ver- 
sion of the proposal implies that visual experience not only in- 
volves color sensations but is also about those sensations, in addi- 
tion to color properties-which is clearly mistaken. 
CONCLUSION 
We do not pretend to have proved that any physicalist theory of 
color must be inadequate, since we have not canvassed every pos- 
sible theory. We think of our arguments as posing a challenge to 
any aspiring physicalist. We challenge the physicalist to explain 
how the physical properties that constitute colors, in his view, are 
represented in visual experience, and to explain it in a way that 
meets reasonable epistemological and phenomenological con- 
straints. 
One might think that the constraints that we have applied 
cannot be met by any theory of color, and hence that they must be 
unreasonable. The solution to the problems we have raised, one 
might conclude, is not to reject physicalism but rather to relax our 
epistemological and phenomenological constraints. In our view, 
however, there is a theory that satisfies these constraints, and it is 
one of the oldest and most familiar. It is the theory that colors are 
qualitative properties of visual experiences that are mistakenly 
projected onto material objects. A defense of that theory must be 
deferred, however, to another occasion.40 
University of Michigan 
40See our "Color Qualia and Color Qualities," in preparation. 
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